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The association between privatisation and
voluntary disclosure: evidence from Jordan
Mahmoud Al-Akra, Ian A. Eddie and Muhammad Jahangir Ali*
Abstract— This paper investigates the impact of privatisation on the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure in Jordan. We
conduct a longitudinal examination using 243 annual reports of 27 privatised ﬁrms in Jordan over a period of nine years from
1996 to 2004. Employing univariate and pooled regression models our results show that privatisation is positively associated
with voluntary disclosure. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that accounting regulation reforms and foreign investments accompanying
privatisation have a signiﬁcant impact on the levels of accounting disclosure in Jordan. Our study provides evidence on the
role of privatisation in improving the disclosure culture as an important pre-condition for the development of active capital
markets.
Keywords: voluntary disclosure; privatisation; Jordan
1. Introduction
In the face of globalisation, and in response to
pressures of international bodies, many countries
have adopted various economic reforms to revitalise
their investment environments. Privatisation is one
of the measures utilised to develop the role of capital
markets in allocating resources. Consequently, in
the past two decades the policy of privatisation has
been employed by more than 100 countries in an
attempt to promote efﬁciency, economic growth and
development (Enthoven, 1998).
Privatisation is deﬁned as ‘the deliberate sale by a
government of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or
assets to private economic agents’ (Megginson and
Netter, 2001: 321). The primary purpose of privat-
isation is to improve the efﬁciency of SOEs. Several
theoretical arguments advanced to explain the
inefﬁciency of SOEs draw on propositions relating
to the governance problems of these ﬁrms. The
weak governance of SOEs stems from the inability
of managers of SOEs to commit to speciﬁc
objectives for the ﬁrm, government interference in
the ﬁrm’s operations, lack of high-powered incen-
tives and lack of proper monitoring of SOE
managers. By contrast, private ownership is
claimed to be more efﬁcient and reﬂective of better
governance (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Hence,
the sale of SOEs to private owners is expected to
enhance the governance of these ﬁrms, including
better disclosure practices.
Further, privatisation aims at mobilising domes-
tic savings, attracting external ﬁnance and conse-
quently promoting the use of markets to allocate
resources. Given the importance of the role that
securities markets plays in privatisation, being the
main avenue throughwhich governments relinquish
their shareholdings, privatising governments sig-
niﬁcantly restructure their securities markets by
establishing a regulatory body similar to the US
Securities and Exchange Commission including
revising and updating their securities market regu-
lation. Securities laws matter a great deal to stock
market development (La Porta et al., 2006) and
ultimately to the improvement of corporate disclo-
sure (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992).
Privatisation transfers ownership to new private
owners, hence, the legal protection of these new
owners becomes of crucial importance to the
success of the privatisation process. To that end,
privatising governments revise and update their
corporate governance structures, including changes
to their legal systems, and establish listing and other
regulations that strengthen shareholders’ protection
and provide for adequate prevention of insider
dealings (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Stronger
investor protection is associated with higher ﬁnan-
cial disclosures (Jaggi and Low, 2000).
Moreover, the new owners resulting from privat-
isation might have different incentives and abilities
to monitor managers, thus the level of monitoring is
expected to lead to the production of different levels
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of information disclosure. In particular, foreign
investors monitor management closely, and require
strong disclosure standards (Boubakri et al., 2005)
to ensure high quality and comparable information.
This is due to the potential information asymmetry
resulting from language and space barriers
(Huafang and Jianguo, 2007).
Although the economic policy of privatisation has
gained signiﬁcant importance, prior research has
failed to explore the impact of privatisation on
privatised ﬁrms’ disclosure practices despite the
signiﬁcant changes privatisation brings about in
terms of ownership changes, corporate governance
and regulatory reform. Accordingly, this study tests
whether privatisation inﬂuences voluntary disclo-
sure of Jordanian privatised ﬁrms. We also examine
whether the ownership changes, corporate govern-
ance and regulatory reform inﬂuence voluntary
disclosure levels of privatised ﬁrms. To our know-
ledge, this is the ﬁrst study which examines the
inﬂuence of privatisation on voluntary corporate
disclosure. Further, Jordan (and the Middle Eastern
region) has been relatively neglected by disclosure
research despite the recent changes in the accounting
regulatory environments in the wake of the recent
move towards globalisation. Jordan is of interest not
only because of its status as a developing country,
but because its government executed a privatisation
program. Hence, documenting and understanding
the impact this program has had on disclosure by
Jordanian ﬁrms takes on particular importance.
We employ a longitudinal examination of volun-
tary disclosure using 243 annual reports of 27
privatised Jordanian listed companies over a period
of nine years from 1996 to 2004. Using univariate
and pooled regression models we observe that the
extent of voluntary disclosure has increased signiﬁ-
cantly through the time period of the study. Results
of the panel data validate the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
privatisation on voluntary disclosure. The results
also suggest that foreign investors, audit commit-
tees and regulatory reforms are factors positively
associated with voluntary disclosure. We demon-
strate that the association of these factors with
voluntary disclosure is more positive when accom-
panying privatisation. We also carry out an add-
itional analysis to reduce the possibility that our
results are driven by time effects. The additional test
indicates that time does not play a signiﬁcant role in
inﬂuencing the level of voluntary disclosure of
Jordanian ﬁrms, thereby providing greater conﬁ-
dence in our ﬁndings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
The next section offers background information
regarding privatisation and disclosure practices in
Jordan. Section 3 develops hypotheses and
Section 4 presents the research design and method-
ology for testing our hypotheses. The results of our
study are analysed in Section 5 while additional
analyses are discussed in Section 6. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. Privatisation and disclosure practices in
Jordan
The Jordanian government’s involvement in the
economy through state-owned enterprises was
intended to achieve several objectives and focus
on serving the national economy including build-
ing, developing and maintaining infrastructure,
import substitution, and regional development.
The government owned substantial shareholdings
in a number of small- and medium-sized industrial
and service sector companies, and various ﬁnancial
institutions. It also had partnerships with the private
sector in major industries and services such as
minerals (cement, phosphate and potash), electri-
city, communications, public transport and tourism
(ASE, 2008).
Public sector institutions and corporations in
Jordan were highly inefﬁcient, provided sub-
standard services and were highly in debt, while
private sector ﬁrms were better performing, produ-
cing higher returns and generating better job
opportunities. The government’s participation in
public shareholding companies comprised around
15% when the privatisation process commenced in
1997, and decreased to less than 6% after it sold its
shares in most of these companies by 2004.
Following privatisation, the government maintains
a share in major infrastructure companies such as
Arab Potash, Jordan Phosphate Mines and Jordan
Petroleum Reﬁnery (ASE, 2008).
The Jordanian privatisation program took several
methods with appropriate modes for each situation
according to the speciﬁcity and particularity of each
transaction, and for the purpose of avoiding the
risks associated with using only one method. The
methods used were: capital sales, e.g. IPO and
divestiture; sales to strategic investors; concession
agreements; management contracts; and franchising
(EPC, 2008). To pave the way for privatisation and
ensure its success, Jordan revised its institutional
framework including its corporate governance
structures, corporate disclosure rules and legal
systems through the enactment of the 1997
Company Law, the 1997 Temporary Securities
Law and the 2002 Securities Law.
The 1997 Company Law focused on the adoption
of the full version of IAS/IFRS by all listed
Jordanian ﬁrms in an attempt to improve transpar-
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ency, comparability and reliability of Jordanian
ﬁrms’ corporate disclosure. Moreover, this law laid
down the governance policy framework which
focused on strengthening legal investor protection
and emphasised the board of directors’ responsibil-
ities in ensuring compliance with mandatory
requirements (ASE, 2008).
The 1997 Temporary Securities Law aimed at
setting up three new institutions to replace the old
Amman Financial Market (AFM), namely: Jordan
Securities Commission (JSC), Amman Stock
Exchange (ASE) and the Securities Depository
Commission (SDC). These three institutions are
responsible for setting and enforcing accounting
regulations, protecting investors and ultimately pro-
moting an investment culture in Jordan (JSC, 2008).
Finally, the 2002 Securities Law called for the
adoption of the full version of the IFRSs. It also
strengthened the powers of the above-mentioned
institutions by giving them the authority to penalise
non-complying ﬁrms. It spelled out the responsi-
bilities of these institutions focusing on strengthen-
ing investor protection and developing stronger
governance frameworks and stringent regulations to
ensure compliance with the new requirements.
Prior to privatisation, disclosure practice in
Jordan was dictated by the Companies Law No. 12
of 1964 (amended in 1989). This law was loosely
stated and very limited in scope (Solas, 1994; Abu-
Nassar and Rutherford, 1996; Rawashdeh, 2003). It
required companies to prepare an annual report with
a proﬁt and loss statement, a balance sheet,
explanatory notes and an auditor’s report.1 No
further requirements were speciﬁed with regard to
the form and content of the ﬁnancial statements. The
Commerce Code (Trade Law No. 12 of 1966) also
required all companies to keep a general journal,
inventory records and a correspondence register.
Again no speciﬁcation was provided as to the form
and content of the accounts (Ott et al., 1997).
Furthermore, the Amman Financial Market (cur-
rently known as Amman Stock Exchange) required
listed Jordanian ﬁrms to prepare annual reports in
accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) without an interpretation of
what constitutes GAAP (Naser, 1998).
3. Development of hypotheses
3.1. Privatisation and voluntary disclosure
The theoretical literature contends that improve-
ments to ﬁrms’ efﬁciency brought about by privat-
isation is due to the change of owners’ identity from
state to private (Megginson and Netter, 2001). The
precondition for the change is the typical inefﬁ-
ciency of state-owned ﬁrms. The main reason for
this inefﬁciency is the weak governance in state-
owned ﬁrms, reﬂecting agency conﬂicts. These
conﬂicts are theoretically twofold. The ﬁrst is public
choice theory that postulates that government actors
(politicians and bureaucrats) use state ownership to
pursue their own objectives such as securing
political ofﬁce, accumulating power, or seeking
rents (Alchian, 1965). Further, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) argue that political interference in the ﬁrm
results in excessive employment, poor choices of
product and location and lack of investment. The
second argument suggests that corporate govern-
ance will be weaker in state-owned ﬁrms than in
privateﬁrms becausemanagers of state-ownedﬁrms
may lack high-powered incentives or proper moni-
toring. This lack of incentives andmonitoring is due
to ‘the weaker accountability for ﬁnancial perform-
ance, easier access toﬁnancing, lack of exposure to a
market for corporate control, and weaker monitor-
ing by shareholders’ (Mak and Li, 2001: 240).
One of the most important functions that corpor-
ate governance can play is ensuring the quality of the
ﬁnancial reporting process. It has been argued
(Chiang, 2005) that companies with better corporate
governance have higher standards of disclosure and
transparency. Chiang (2005) concludes that com-
panies with better governance signal this by better
information disclosure to outsiders in order to
develop a good image. Further, prior research has
found an association between weaknesses in gov-
ernance, and poor ﬁnancial reporting quality, earn-
ings manipulation, ﬁnancial statement fraud, and
weaker internal controls (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996;
Beasley, 1996; McMullen, 1996; Beasley et al.,
2000;Carcello andNeal, 2000;Klein, 2002).Hence,
the weak governance of state-owned ﬁrms might be
viewed as a source of poor corporate disclosure.
A number of empirical studies have tested the
impact of state ownership on disclosure practice
(Naser, 1998; Naser and Al-Khatib, 2000; Naser et
al., 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Cheng and
Courtenay, 2006); however, these studies report
mixed ﬁndings.2 A plausible explanation can be that
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the depth of disclosure by Jordanian ﬁrms in the ﬁrst and third
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government ownership on voluntary disclosure.
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extant studies do not examine the impact of state
ownership within the context of privatisation.
Given the signiﬁcant changes that the transfer of
ownership from the state to the private sector brings
about, as these ﬁrms experience a fundamental shift
in their governance we expect privatised ﬁrms to
exhibit higher disclosure levels under private own-
ership. Therefore, we hypothesise:
H1: The level of voluntary disclosure for privat-
ised ﬁrms is higher under private ownership
than under state ownership.
Following other privatisation studies (see
Bortolotti et al., 2002; Boubakri et al., 2005), we
introduce a dummy variable to test for the effect of
privatisation (PRIV) that takes the value of one
starting from the date when the ﬁrm is privatised.
3.2. Ownership structure and voluntary disclosure
The transfer of ownership from the state to private
owners resulting from privatisation leads to diffused
ownership structure and results in increased agency
costs (Boycko et al., 1996). One way of reducing
these agency costs could be through the voluntary
disclosure of more information about the ﬁrm so
that owners can better monitor their interests in the
ﬁrm, and managers can reduce the agency costs that
they bear. Wallace and Naser (1995) argue that the
greater the number of people who need to know
about the affairs of a ﬁrm the more comprehensive
the disclosure of the ﬁrm. Singhvi and Desai (1971),
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), and Bauwhede
and Willekens (2008) provide empirical evidence
supporting this argument.
Alternatively, diffused ownership may imply a
lack of monitoring capacity due to the low owner-
ship stake of individual owners reducing their
inﬂuence on the company’s disclosure practices.
Wallace and Naser (1995), Hossain et al. (1994) and
Barako et al. (2006) provide evidence in support of
this view. Further, Naser and Al-Khatib (2000) and
Naser et al. (2002) note that Jordanian individual
investors are not sophisticated and their investment
decisions are uninformed. They ﬁnd a negative
association between individual ownership and dis-
closure. Therefore, it is not clear whether Jordanian
individual investors inﬂuence voluntary disclosure
levels of privatised ﬁrms. As a result, our hypothesis
is non-directional for this type of ownership.
H1a: The level of voluntary disclosure of privat-
ised ﬁrms is not associated with the propor-
tion of individual investors.
Another type of private ownership is institutional
investors. Firms with large institutional ownership
tend to increase their levels of voluntary disclosure
(El-Gazzar, 1998). However, the author explains
that when ownership is concentrated in the hands of
a few institutions, these institutions may act like
insiders and have better access to private informa-
tion, hence they may not press for public disclosure.
In Jordan, institutions are either passive or related to
a controlling family (ROSC, 2005) implying that
their presence would likely be associated with lower
voluntary disclosure. Empirical evidence reﬂects a
signiﬁcant association between institutional invest-
ors and voluntary disclosure (El-Gazzar, 1998),
while Ajinkya et al. (2004) observe a negative
association with concentrated institutional invest-
ors. Again, the evidence of the relation between
Jordanian institutional investors and voluntary
disclosure is not clear. Hence, our hypothesis is
also non-directional for institutional investors.
H1b: The level of voluntary disclosure of privat-
ised ﬁrms is not associated with the propor-
tion of institutional investors.
One of the major aims of privatisation is the
attraction of foreign investment. Shehadi (2002)
contends that over 90% of foreign direct investment
in developing countries has come from privatisa-
tion. The author suggests that privatisation facili-
tates the involvement of foreign investment in
developing countries through three main channels.
The ﬁrst is directly, through the adoption of
regulatory measures that would liberalise trade,
open the capital market to competition and allow
foreign investors to own shares in listed companies.
The second is indirectly, through increasing the
liquidity of the capital market, which provides
investors with an exit strategy. The third is through a
catalytic impact by gaining the conﬁdence of
foreign investors as governments show commit-
ment to privatisation and liberalisation.
Brown et al. (2004: 12) posit that ‘foreign owners
have better access to ﬁnance, management skills,
new technologies and knowledge of markets, which
would suggest higher productivity effects’. Foreign
investors are a source of better governance and
higher performance (Boycko et al., 1996; Dyck,
2001), place more emphasis on efﬁciency, require
higher disclosure standards and monitor manage-
ment more effectively (Boubakri et al., 2005).
Moreover, foreign investors likely face a higher
level of information asymmetry because of lan-
guage barriers and the geographical separation
between management and owners (Haniffa and
Cooke 2002; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007).
Accordingly, foreign investors demand more infor-
mation before investing in foreign ﬁrms leading to a
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higher level of voluntary disclosure. This is espe-
cially pertinent for emerging markets where foreign
investors may face greater uncertainty and unfamili-
arity than local investors and thus demand greater
disclosures from target companies.3
While empirical evidence investigating the
impact of foreign investors on voluntary disclosure
is limited, the results support the signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence of foreign investors on the extent of voluntary
disclosure (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Lakhal,
2005). Further, Naser et al. (2002) contend that
foreign investors have more experience in regional
and international markets and hence they are more
likely to demand higher disclosure standards.
Following the above arguments, it can be hypothe-
sised that:
H1c: The level of voluntary disclosure of privat-
ised ﬁrms is positively associated with the
proportion of foreign ownership.
In Jordan, Arab investors constitute a signiﬁcant
percentage of investors in the Amman Stock
Exchange (ROSC, 2005). Anecdotal evidence
points to the fact that Arab investors have little
experience of dealing with stock exchanges (Naser
and Al-Khatib, 2000). Naser et al. (2002) is the only
empirical study that examines the inﬂuence of Arab
investors on the depth of information disclosure of
Jordanian listed ﬁrms, but they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of Arab investors on corporate disclosure
in Jordan. Hence, we exclude Arab ownership from
our study.
3.3. Regulatory reforms and voluntary disclosure
Given the importance of the role that the securities
market plays in privatisation, being the main avenue
through which governments relinquish their share-
holdings, privatising governments signiﬁcantly
restructure their securities markets by establishing
a regulatory body similar to the US Securities and
Exchange Commission including revamping their
securities market regulation. Securities laws matter
a great deal to stock market development (La Porta
et al., 2006) and ultimately to the improvement of
corporate disclosure (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992).
Moreover, privatisation causes major changes in
ownership from the state to private owners, signiﬁ-
cantly altering the ownership structure of ﬁrms.
Hence, the legal protection of the new owners
becomes of crucial importance to the success of the
privatisation process. To that end, governments
undertaking privatisation programmes revise and
update their corporate governance structures,
including changes to their legal systems, and
establish the listing and other regulations that
strengthen shareholders’ protection and provide
for adequate prevention of insider dealings
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). Stronger investor
protection is associated with higher ﬁnancial dis-
closures (Jaggi and Low, 2000).
Jordan introduced a set of accounting regulatory
reforms aimed at modernising existing laws and
creating a more favourable investment environment
through the enactment of the 1997 Company Law,
the 1997 Temporary Securities Law and the 2002
Securities Law (see Section 3.1). These laws called
for the mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS and
developed the Jordanian corporate governance
policy framework and substantially enhanced
legal investor protection. It can therefore be
expected that these regulatory reforms will enhance
corporate disclosure. We develop two variables:
LAW 1 and LAW 2. LAW 1 is a dichotomous
variable that takes the value of one starting from the
date when the 1997 Company Law and the 1997
Temporary Securities Law are enacted, and zero
otherwise.4 The second variable is LAW 2 which is
a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one
starting from the date when the 2002 Securities Law
is enacted, and zero otherwise. The following
hypotheses are formulated:
H2a: The level of voluntary disclosure for privat-
ised ﬁrms is positively associated with the
introduction of LAW 1.
H2b: The level of voluntary disclosure for privat-
ised ﬁrms is positively associated with the
introduction of LAW 2.
3.4. Corporate governance reform and voluntary
disclosure
As argued above, the Jordanian governance policy
framework dealt with issues of the board of directors
mandating the appointment of at least three non-
executive directors on the board and mandating of
audit committees to be comprised of at least three
non-executive directors. Therefore, we investigate
the inﬂuence of these two recently mandated
governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure.
The board of directors is the central internal
mechanism for monitoring management (Mak and
Li, 2001). Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that non-
executive directors act as a reliable mechanism to
reduce agency conﬂicts between managers and
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owners through encouraging management to dis-
close more information. It is further suggested that
the presence of outside directors may limit man-
agement opportunism (Eng and Mak, 2003).
Besides their monitoring role, non-executive dir-
ectors are perceived as respected advisors; thus,
they have an inﬂuence on the quality of ﬁrms’
disclosures (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).
Empirical evidence regarding the inﬂuence of
non-executive directors on management disclosure
is mixed. Chen and Jaggi (2000), Susilowati et al.
(2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) all report
signiﬁcant positive association between the pro-
portion of independent directors and voluntary
disclosure. On the other hand, Forker (1992) and
Ho and Wong (2001) document an insigniﬁcant
relationship between the ratio of outside directors
and voluntary disclosure. However, Eng and Mak
(2003), Gul and Leung (2004) and Barako et al.
(2006) all outline signiﬁcant negative associations
between the ratio of non-executive directors and
voluntary disclosure. Jordanian ﬁrms comply well
with the requirements of the 1997 Company Law
and the 2002 Securities Law (ROSC, 2005)
appointing at least three non-executive directors.
Hence we expect the presence of non-executive
directors to positively inﬂuence voluntary disclo-
sure levels.
H3a: The level of voluntary disclosure for privat-
ised ﬁrms is positively associated with the
proportion of non-executive directors.
Audit committees are viewed as monitoring
mechanisms that oversee various aspects of gov-
ernance in the ﬁrm including the internal control
structure, internal and external audit functions and
ensuring the quality of ﬁnancial reporting
(Bradbury, 1990; DeZoort, 1997). Audit commit-
tees play an intermediary role between the external
auditor and management, and assist in maintaining
the independence of external auditors so that high
quality reporting is achieved in terms of compliance
with disclosure standards (Susilowati et al., 2005).
Previous research provides evidence of the positive
impact of an audit committee on corporate disclo-
sure. For instance, Forker (1992), McMullen
(1996), Ho and Wong (2001) and Barako et al.
(2006) all demonstrate a signiﬁcant positive asso-
ciation between the presence of audit committees
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Therefore,
we test the following hypothesis:
H3b: The level of voluntary disclosure for privat-
ised ﬁrms is positively associated with the
presence of audit committees.
3.4. Company characteristics
Previous empirical disclosure research advanced
several arguments drawing on agency theory,
signalling theory and capital market theory,
hypothesising the impact of certain corporate
attributes on voluntary disclosure (Chow and
Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al.,
1994; Inchausti, 1997; Chen and Jaggi, 2000;
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). This study tests
the inﬂuence of the following variables: sales,
leverage, proﬁtability, liquidity, auditor type, and
industry type (see Table 2). The choice of these
variables was based on their relevance to the socio-
economic environment of Jordan, the ease of
measurement and the availability of data relating
to these variables.
4. Research design and methodology
4.1. Data selection
Privatised public non-ﬁnancial companies listed on
Amman Stock Exchange represent the population
for this study. Annual reports over the period of nine
years from 1996 to 2004 were used. Employing
panel data techniques allows us to examine how
ownership changes and governance reforms impact
voluntary disclosure. Sample companies were
chosen based on the availability of their annual
reports and the requirement that they must be listed
for the entire period of the study. To ensure that the
maximum number of annual reports was obtained, a
letter was sent to the Company Controller at the
Ministry of Industry and Trade in Jordan (where all
annual reports are ﬁled) requesting the annual
reports. In all, the ﬁnal sample consists of
243 annual reports of 27 privatised ﬁrms. Table 1
shows sector representation of the sample com-
panies (4 infrastructure, 16 manufacturing and
7 services companies).
4.2. Dependent variable – voluntary disclosure
indices (VDI)
A disclosure index is developed to measure the
extent of voluntary disclosure (the dependent
variable) by Jordanian companies. To establish the
disclosure index, a voluntary disclosure checklist is
prepared based on information ﬁrms provide in their
annual reports. To arrive at the items for the
checklist an extensive review of previous voluntary
disclosure studies, particularly developing coun-
tries’ studies, was undertaken as a guide in selecting
the most common items across those studies
(Buckland et al., 2000; Hossain et al., 1994;
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003;
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Barako et al., 2006). The items in the checklist must
be non-mandatory. This means the information
disclosed is over and above what is required by the
1997 Company Law and the 2002 Securities Law,
the two sources for disclosure regulation in Jordan.
However, due to the introduction of the Securities
Law in 2002 mandating certain disclosure require-
ments that were voluntary prior to this date, two
disclosure checklists were prepared. These lists
were sent to three auditing professionals in Jordan
to consult them on the relevance and extensiveness
of the voluntary disclosure items. The ﬁnal lists are
comprised of 90 items applicable for the annual
reports of 1996–2002 and 81 voluntary items
applicable for the annual reports from 2003–2004.
They contain background information, strategic
information, information about directors, capital
market data, product/services information, ﬁnancial
data, employees’ information and segments and
research information.
The study uses an unweighted scoring approach
appropriate for a study that does not consider the
information needs of any speciﬁc group (Ghazali
andWeetman, 2006). We also do not penalise a ﬁrm
for non-disclosure if the item is not relevant to the
ﬁrm. Such a judgment can be made after reading the
entire annual report (Cooke, 1992). Accordingly,
the annual report for each company is awarded a
score of 1 if a voluntary item is disclosed and 0 if it
failed to disclose it, provided it is relevant.
Therefore, the VDI for each company is measured
as the ratio of the actual score awarded to the
maximum possible score, deﬁned as follows
VDIjt ¼
Xnjt
i¼1
xijt
njt
ð1Þ
where:
VDI jt = the voluntary disclosure index for the jth
company in the year t, where t is 1996–
2004;
n jt = number of voluntary items that were
relevant for the jth ﬁrm in the year t, n jt
either 90 (for the years 1996–2002) or 81
(for 2003–2004);
xijt = 1 if the ith (relevant) item is disclosed by
the company j in the year t;
0 if the ith (relevant) item is not disclosed;
Therefore, 0 ≤ VDIjt ≤ 1.
4.3. Independent variables
Information for the independent variables was
sought from two main sources, the annual reports
and the Annual Jordanian Shareholding Company
Guide for the years (1997–2005)5 available at the
web site of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE).
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Table 1
Distribution of sample according to industry
Industry Industry type Number of companies (n = 27)
Industry 1 Infrastructure 1. Electricity 1
2. Cement 1
3. Minerals 1
4. Petroleum 1
Industry 2 Manufacturing 1. Cable and electrical product 1
2. Chemical and pharmaceutical 3
3. Engineering 1
4. Food and allied products 4
6. Metals and allied products 1
8. Paper and printing 2
9. Textile products 2
10. Clay product and refractory 1
11. Leather and tanneries 1
Industry 3 Services 1. Hotels and tourism 2
2. Press 1
3. Investment 1
5. Transport 3
5 The Annual Jordanian Shareholding Company Guide is
published by Amman Stock Exchange annually. It contains
information about companies’ boards, shareholders, and ﬁnan-
cial information.
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Table 2
Deﬁnition and measurement of independent variables
Variable Deﬁnition Measurement Data source
PRIV Privatisation Dummy variable: 1 when ﬁrms are
privatised onward; 0 otherwise;
EPC
STO State ownership Total percentage of ordinary shares held
by the state;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
FOW Foreign
ownership
Total percentage of ordinary shares held
by foreign investors (non-Arab);
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
INDOW Individual
ownership
Total percentage of ordinary shares held
by domestic individuals holding 10% or
less of the shares;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
IOW Institutional
ownership
Total percentage of ordinary shares held
by institutional investors;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
LAW 1 The 1997
Company Law
and the 1997
Temporary
Securities Law
Dummy variable: 1 starting from the
date when the 1997 Company Law and
the 1997 Temporary Securities Law are
enacted, and zero otherwise;
–
LAW 2 The 2002
Securities Law
Dummy variable: 1 starting from the
date when the 2002 Securities Law is
enacted, and zero otherwise.
–
PNED Percentage of
non-executive
directors
Number of outside directors to the total
number of directors on the board;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
AC Audit committee Dummy variable: 1 if an audit
committee is present, 0 otherwise;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
Sales Company size Net sales/revenues; Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
LEV Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to shareholders’
equity;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
LIQ Liquidity ratio Current ratio: ratio of current assets to
current liabilities;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
PROF Proﬁtability Return on equity; Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
AUD Size of auditor Dummy variable: 1 if auditor is one of
the Big auditing ﬁrms, 0 otherwise;
Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
Industry
types
IND1 Infrastructure 1 if infrastructure, 0 otherwise; Annual Jordanian
Shareholding Company
Guide 1997–2005
IND2 Manufacturing 0 default level;
IND3 Services 1 if services, 0 otherwise.
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Table 2 summarises the deﬁnitions and measure-
ment of the independent variables.
4.4. Model speciﬁcation
To test our hypotheses, the following pooled model
was estimated:
VDIjt ¼ b0 þ b1PRIVj þ b2STOjt þ b3FOWjt
þ b4INDOWjt þ b5IOWjt þ b6LAW1
þ b7LAW2þ b8PNEDjt þ b9ACjt
þ b10Salesjt þ b11LEVjt þ b12LIQjt
þ b13PROFjt þ b14AUDjt þ b15IND1jt
þ b16IND2jt þ b17IND3jt þ ei ð2Þ
where:
VDIjt = Voluntary disclosure index;
PRIVj = Dummy variable; 1 when the
ﬁrm is privatised onward; 0
before;
STOjt = Total percentage of ordinary
shares held by the state of ﬁrm
j in year t;
FOWjt = Total percentage of ordinary
shares held by foreign investors
(non-Arab) of ﬁrm j in year t;
INDOWjt = Total percentage of ordinary
shares held by domestic indi-
viduals holding 10% or less of
the shares of ﬁrm j in year t;
IOWjt = Total percentage of ordinary
shares held by institutional
investors of ﬁrm j in year t;
LAW 1 = Dummy variable: 1 starting
from the date when the 1997
Company Law and the 1997
Temporary Securities Law are
enacted onward, and zero other-
wise;
LAW 2 = Dummy variable: 1 starting
from the date when the 2002
Securities Law is enacted
onward, and zero otherwise.
PNEDjt = Number of outside directors to
the total number of directors on
the board s of the shares of ﬁrm
j in year t;
ACjt = Dummy variable: 1 if an audit
committee is present in ﬁrm j in
year t, 0 otherwise;
Salesjt = Net sales/revenues of ﬁrm j in
year t;
LEVjt = Ratio of total liabilities to share-
holders’ equity of ﬁrm j in year
t;
LIQjt = Ratio of current assets to cur-
rent liabilities of ﬁrm j in year t;
PROFjt = Return on equity of ﬁrm j in
year t;
AUDjt = Dummy variable: 1 if one of the
Big auditing ﬁrms are
employed by ﬁrm j in year t, 0
otherwise;
IND1jt = 1 if ﬁrm j in year t is infra-
structure, 0 otherwise;
IND2jt = 0 default level
IND3jt = 1 if ﬁrm j in year t is services, 0
otherwise;
Βо,β1,β2 . . . .β26 = The regression estimates, and
e1 = The stochastic disturbance
term.
In addition to the pooled regression speciﬁed above,
we carry out two additional analyses. In the ﬁrst, we
test whether privatisation enhances the positive
inﬂuence of ownership changes, audit committees
and regulatory reforms on voluntary disclosure
levels. We examine this issue by including inter-
action terms of the variables in question with
privatisation. Our second test aims at ascertaining
whether the increase in the level of voluntary
disclosure is due to privatisation and the accom-
panying regulatory reforms and not to time effects.
To control for time effects, we perform two
comparisons between ﬁrms that were privatised
early with ﬁrms that were privatised later on, and
between ﬁrms that were privatised later on with
private ﬁrms (ﬁrms that were not subject to
privatisation). Section 6 details the methodology
and results of these analyses.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all
variables (Panel B) and compares data for 1996
with 2004 (Panel A).
The table indicates a notable decrease in state
ownership, while foreign6 and institutional share-
holdings havemarkedly increased. It also points to a
decrease in individual ownership7 which is surpris-
ing given the aim of privatisation which is primarily
to promote an equity culture in the privatising
country. A possible explanation could be due to
political instability as a result of war and unrest in
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6 Arab ownership is not included in foreign ownership.
7We exclude individuals who are block owners of 10% or
more.
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neighbouring countries leading to the reluctance of
many small individuals to trade in the capital
market.
In 1996 the net sales/revenues of the sample
companies increased from an average of 37.34m to
59.113m Jordanian Dinars. While leverage and
liquidity declined, proﬁtability measured by return
on equity showed a notable rise. The number of
companies utilising the services of the Big auditing
ﬁrms increased signiﬁcantly from around 48% to
82% of the sample companies. Panel B shows that
some variables are highly skewed, and hence they
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the privatised ﬁrms
Panel A: Comparison between 1996 and 2004
Variable Years Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std dev.
STO (%) 1996
2004
22.69
8.39
15.74
1.80
0.04
0.00
78.95
55.39
22.23
13.42
FOW (%) 1996
2004
0.84
3.95
0.04
0.09
0.00
0.00
12.42
48.53
2.48
10.57
INDOW (%) 1996
2004
39.98
29.62
40.64
22.44
0.19
0.14
88.81
66.20
23.49
20.87
IOW (%) 1996
2004
20.88
27.66
17.36
24.75
0.00
0.54
42.58
69.59
13.63
20.43
PNED (%) 1996
2004
0.28
0.28
0.30
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.46
0.78
0.14
0.21
Sales (JD) 1996
2004
37,341,051
59,311,277
6,453,355
7,064,271
0
82,319
493,458,976
861,840,893
98,025,222
170,531,459
LEV (%) 1996
2004
92.90
84.10
49.00
27.00
0.30
1.70
571.70
340.10
140.5
108.8
LIQ (%) 1996
2004
5.26
4.03
1.97
2.26
0.40
0.74
88.15
25.75
16.63
5.01
PROF (%) 1996
2004
3.67
6.03
8.69
7.90
–75.49
–38.41
24.65
31.93
19.36
15.52
Categorical variables 1 (%) 0 (%)
AC 1996
2004
0
37%
100
63%
AUD 1996
2004
48.15%
81.48%
51.85%
18.52%
Panel B: All ﬁrms
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std dev. Skewness
STO (%) 15.33 7.84 0.00 78.95 18.75 1.44
FOW (%) 2.52 0.04 0.00 52.46 8.61 4.79
INDOW (%) 33.69 37.21 0.14 88.81 21.49 0.14
IOW (%) 27.28 24.59 0.00 69.59 19.10 0.39
PNED (%) 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.78 0.16 0.37
Sales (JD) 47,451,121 6,918,592 0.00 851,647,495 122,864,093 4.69466
LEV (%) 81.40 39.80 0.30 571.7 117.8 2.62813
LIQ (%) 4.58 2.21 0.40 88.15 10.22 7.15537
PROF (%) 4.36 6.47 –75.49 31.93 15.36 –2.12099
Categorical variables 1 (%) 0 (%)
PRIV 57% 43%
LAW 1 89% 11%
LAW 2 33% 67%
AC 14% 86%
AUD 70% 30 %
IND1 14% 86%
IND3 26% 74%
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were transformed as follows: foreign ownership
using the second root, sales using natural logarithm,
and the variables leverage, liquidity, and proﬁtabil-
ity using cosine.
Panel A, Table 4 presents the distribution of total
voluntary disclosure scores for selected years. The
level of voluntary disclosure is generally moderate
over the nine-year study period. Comparing data for
1996 with that of 2000 and 2004, the table
demonstrates an increase in the level of voluntary
disclosure by Jordanian companies. By the year
2004, four companies had disclosed more than 50%
of the items included in the disclosure index (three
in 2000). Also, in 1996, seven companies scored
less than 10% of the voluntary disclosure index
(ﬁve in 2000) whereas by 2004 only one company
was in that category, thereby signifying a noticeable
increase in the voluntary disclosure by the privat-
ised ﬁrms. Panel B shows the distribution of
privatisation across the time period of the study.
By comparing the data in this panel with disclosure
scores given in Panel A, the number of companies
showing improvement in voluntary disclosure
levels corresponds well with those being privatised.
The above ﬁndings are also conﬁrmed by the
comparisons of means of the extent of voluntary
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Table 4
Panel A: Distribution of total voluntary disclosure scores: selected years: 1996, 2000 and 2004
Disclosure score
(%)
1996 2000 2004
No. of
companies
% No. of
companies
% No. of
companies
%
<=0.1 7 25.9 5 18.5 1 3.7
0.11–0.2 14 51.9 11 40.8 12 44.4
0.21–0.3 3 11.1 6 22.2 7 25.9
0.31–0.4 0 0 1 3.7 3 11.1
0.41–0.5 3 11.1 1 3.7 0 0
0.51–0.6 0 0 3 11.1 2 7.5
> 0.6 0 0 0 0 2 7.5
Panel B: Distribution of privatisation across the time period: 1996–2004
Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
No. of companies 8 2 3 3 1 2 8
Accumulation 8 10 13 16 17 19 27
Panel C: Comparison of voluntary disclosure: 1996, 2000 and 2004
VDI (N = 27) 1996 2000 2004
Mean 0.168 0.220 0.264
Median 0.137 0.176 0.203
Minimum 0.028 0.083 0.085
Maximum 0.440 0.595 0.649
Panel D: Tests of equality of means of voluntary disclosure: 1996, 2000 and 2004
Paired t-test
t-statistic P value*
2000 versus 1996 2.80 0.009
2004 versus 2000 4.33 0.000
2004 versus 1996 4.81 0.000
*All probabilities are two-tailed.
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disclosure (Panel C). It can be seen that the level of
voluntary disclosure is generally lower in 1996 than
in 2000 and that in 2004, with means of 0.1677 in
1996, 0.2196 in 2000 and 0.2635 in 2004 indicating
an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure in
the annual reports of listed privatised Jordanian
companies. Further, the results of the paired-t test
were signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, thereby validating
the above results (Panel D).
Table 5 depicts the Pearson correlation matrix of
the dependent and independent continuous vari-
ables. The extent of voluntary disclosure is highly
positively correlated with foreign ownership and
sales, and to a lesser extent with the proportion of
non-executive directors and state ownership.
However, a negative correlation coefﬁcient is
reported for individual and institutional owners
implying an association of these types of owners
with less disclosure. The highest absolute correl-
ation coefﬁcient between the independent variables
is (0.493) between the proportion of non-executive
directors and net sales, implying that multicolli-
nearity does not constitute a major problem.8
5.2. Pooled regression results
Table 6 provides the results for the pooled regres-
sion model using both the cross sectional and time
series data. To accommodate panel data, we need to
control for unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc and temporal
effects. We believe that the inclusion of industry
ﬁxed effects would capture ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects
since each ﬁrm exhibits the same characteristics as
the whole industry. Further, the introduction of the
variable PRIV controls for any temporal changes in
the ﬁrm’s environment.
In order to conduct regression analysis, several
assumptions must be satisﬁed, these are: linearity of
relationships, absence of multicollinearity, the val-
ues of the dependent variable are normally distrib-
uted for the values of each of the independent
variables; and the residuals have constant variance
throughout the domain of the independent variables
(homoscedasticity). Tests of multicollinearity are
conducted using the Pearson correlation matrix and
the variance inﬂation factor.9 To test for the
assumption of a normally distributed residual
error, histograms of the studentised residuals and
normal plots are used. Homoscedasticity is tested
using the studentised residuals plots against the
predicted values of the dependent variable and the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test.
As Table 6, model 1 illustrates PRIV has a
positive signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, supporting H1 and
pointing to the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of privatisation
on the extent of voluntary disclosure. This result
suggests that privatisation is successful in enhan-
cing voluntary disclosure levels of privatised ﬁrms.
The table also suggests that foreign investors are
positively associated with voluntary disclosure
levels supporting H1c.10 This conﬁrms the super-
iority of foreign investors in demanding higher
disclosure standards and undertaking more moni-
toring of management (Boubakri et al., 2005). The
coefﬁcient of individual ownership is negatively
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Table 5
Pearson correlation matrix for explanatory variables
VDI STO FOW INDOW IOW PNED Sales LEV LIQ
STO 0.230**
FOW 0.602*** 0.076
INDOW –0.210* –0.373*** –0.077 –0.077
IOW –0.266** –0.184* –0.143 –0.352***
PNED 0.284*** –0.170* 0.140** 0.395*** –0.198*
Sales 0.436*** 0.164 0.368*** –0.094 –0.198** 0.493***
LEV 0.041 0.150 0.015 0.178* –0.277** 0.054 –0.024
LIQ 0.056 –0.121 0.117 0.004 0.004 0.070 0.053 –0.060
PROF 0.004 –0.231** –0.055 0.112 0.138 –0.119 0.063 –0.086 –0.032
***Correlation signiﬁcant at 0.01 level (two-tailed);
** Correlation signiﬁcant at 0.05 level (two-tailed);
* Correlation signiﬁcant at 0.1 level (two-tailed).
8 A rule of thumb is that multicollinearity may be a problem if
a correlation is > 0.7 in the correlation matrix formed by the
independent variables.
9 The VIF values shown in Table 6 indicate absence of
multicollinearity problems since they do not exceed 10 (Neter et
al., 1989). The highest VIF value is 4.5 concluding that
multicollinearity does not constitute a problem.
10 Foreign ownership variable is not signiﬁcant when it is
measured taking into account Arab ownership.
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related to disclosure, while the coefﬁcient of
institutional investors is insigniﬁcant. The result
of individual ownership is consistent with Hossain
et al. (1994) and is evidence that the greater the
individual shareholdings, the lesser the monitoring
capacity. The result for institutional investors
supports the view that they are primarily block
owners relying on insider-provided information,
hence reducing the need for public disclosure.
With respect to the regulatory reforms, the
coefﬁcients of LAW 1 and LAW 2 are signiﬁcant,
supporting H2a and H2b. This indicates that the
accounting regulatory reforms through the enact-
ment of the 1997 Company Law, the 1997
Temporary Securities Law and the 2002 Securities
Law produce signiﬁcant positive inﬂuences on the
extent of voluntary disclosure of privatised
Jordanian ﬁrms. Further, the coefﬁcient of AC is
highly signiﬁcant, supporting H3b and implying
that the presence of audit committees results in
ﬁrms having higher voluntary disclosure. A some-
what surprising result is the insigniﬁcance of the
non-executive directors (PNED) coefﬁcient. A
possible explanation for this result is due to the
requirement of the 1997 Company Law that all
directors on the board to be shareholders thereby
jeopardising the independence of the non-executive
directors, and hence reducing their role in monitor-
ing management and in enhancing disclosure
quality.
Regarding company characteristics, the variables
Sales (net sales/revenues), AUD (auditor type) and
IND1 (industry type 1) are all signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. The
result for sales as a proxy for company size is
consistent with almost all disclosure studies and the
Meta analysis of Ahmed and Courtis (1999).
Auditor type is negatively associated with the
extent of voluntary disclosure (at the 0.05 level).
The result of auditor type is consistent with the
ﬁndings of Jordanian studies (Naser and Al-Khatib,
2000; Naser et al., 2002). Industry type 1 (infra-
structure) is highly signiﬁcant indicating that these
ﬁrms are far superior in the extent of their informa-
tion disclosure, reﬂecting the signiﬁcance of their
activities, hence the production of comprehensive
and detailed information.
6. Additional analyses and robustness
checks
6.1. Ownership, accounting regulatory reform and
privatisation
So far, we have analysed different types of owner-
ship and related them to corporate disclosure based
on their incentives and abilities to monitor man-
agement. However, privatisation leads to the trans-
fer of ownership from the state to private investors.
In particular, privatisation facilitates the involve-
ment of foreign investors who place greater
emphasis on proﬁt and efﬁciency (Boycko et al.,
1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), maintain strict
monitoring of management actions and demand a
high standard of comparable information disclosure
(Dyck, 2001). Hence, if privatisation results in an
increase in voluntary disclosure levels as it changes
the ownership structure of privatised ﬁrms to those
new owners; we would expect a more positive effect
for those new owners with voluntary disclosure. To
test whether privatisation enhances the positive
association between ownership and voluntary dis-
closure levels in privatised ﬁrms we introduce an
additional explanatory variable that reﬂects inter-
action of ownership variables with privatisation.
Since institutional and individual owners do not
produce a positive impact on voluntary disclosure,
we only include an interaction term for foreign
investors with privatisation.
Additionally, we examined the inﬂuence of
governance and regulatory reforms on voluntary
disclosure levels of privatised ﬁrms. Privatising
governments signiﬁcantly change their corporate
governance arrangements, including changes to
their legal systems, signiﬁcantly restructuring their
securities markets by establishment of a regulatory
body similar to the US Securities and Exchange
Commission, and establishment of listing and other
regulations strengthening shareholders’ protection
and providing for adequate prevention of insider
dealings (Megginson and Netter, 2001). If privat-
isation enhances the levels of voluntary disclosure
when these reforms are implemented, then we
would expect to ﬁnd a positive interaction effect of
the reforms and privatisation on voluntary disclo-
sure. We examine this issue by including additional
explanatory variables that reﬂect interaction of the
reforms (pertaining to LAW 1, LAW 2 and AC)11
with privatisation.
Table 6, Model 2 provides the results of the
interaction terms. The coefﬁcient of PRIV*FOW is
signiﬁcantly positive suggesting that changes in
ownership as a result of privatisation to foreign
investors has a more positive impact on voluntary
disclosure. Further, the interaction coefﬁcients of
PRIV with LAW 1, LAW 2 and AC are all
positively signiﬁcant, thereby pointing to a more
positive effect of the regulatory reforms accom-
panying privatisation on voluntary disclosure prac-
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11We do not include PNED since this variable does not have
any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on voluntary disclosure.
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tices of privatised Jordanian ﬁrms. These results
suggest that the effect of foreign investors, the
mandate of audit committees and the regulatory
reforms are more positive when accompanying
privatisation.
6.2. Privatisation and time effect
In this section, we consider whether the increase in
the level of voluntary disclosure is due to privat-
isation and the accompanying regulatory reforms
and not to time effects. To control for time effects,
we compare ﬁrms that were privatised early with
ﬁrms that were privatised later on.12 However, this
would limit the analysis to the ﬁrst years of
privatisation (from 1996 to 2000); therefore, we
perform a second comparison over the rest of the
privatisation period (from 2000 to 2004) between
ﬁrms that were privatised later on and private ﬁrms
(ﬁrms that were not subject to privatisation).
We ﬁrst compare two sets of ﬁrms; ﬁrms that
were privatised before 2000 with ﬁrms that were
privatised after 200013 over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the
study (1996–2000). Accordingly, the comparison
process is conducted between 65 observations in the
ﬁrst set (13 annual reports per year), with 55
observations in the second (11 annual reports per
year).14 Table 7 presents the results of the ﬁrst
comparison. As the table indicates, privatisation,
foreign ownership, LAW 1 (the 1997 Company
Law and the 1997 Temporary Securities Law),
PNED (the percentage of non-executive directors),
and AC (audit committees) are all signiﬁcant,
conﬁrming the results of the previous regression
models. All coefﬁcients of the year dummy vari-
ables are not signiﬁcant implying that time did not
have a signiﬁcant impact on voluntary disclosure of
privatised ﬁrms and that the improvement in
disclosure practices is due to privatisation and the
accompanying reforms.
The results of the matching group of late
privatised ﬁrms show that LAW 1 is signiﬁcant,
while foreign ownership, PNED and AC are all
insigniﬁcant. These results can be interpreted as
follows: privatised ﬁrms attract foreign investment
and comply better with the requirements of the 1997
Company Law, hence enhancing their voluntary
disclosure levels. Coefﬁcients of the year dummy
variables are again insigniﬁcant.
The second comparison matches two sets of
ﬁrms; ﬁrms that were privatised between 2000 and
2004, and compares them with privately owned
ﬁrms over the same period. Therefore, the matching
process is conducted between 70 observations in the
ﬁrst set (14 annual reports per year over a ﬁve-year
period) with 70 observations in the second
(14 annual reports per year). Table 8 shows the
results of the two groups of ﬁrms. For the ﬁrst group
of late privatised ﬁrms, privatisation, foreign own-
ership (FOW), LAW2 and audit committee (AC) are
all positively related to voluntary disclosure, while
the variables FOW, LAW2 and AC are positively
related with voluntary disclosure of private ﬁrms.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm the results found earlier that
privatisation, the accompanying reforms and for-
eign investors have inﬂuenced voluntary disclosure.
The results also show that the regulatory reforms
and foreign investment have inﬂuenced private
Jordanian ﬁrms. The results for the year dummy
variables suggest that time did not play a signiﬁcant
role in inﬂuencing the level of voluntary disclosure
of Jordanian ﬁrms. All models show that Sales and
IND1 are signiﬁcant supporting the previous
ﬁndings.15
While private ﬁrms in the second comparison
show signiﬁcant results for foreign ownership and
audit committees, state-owned ﬁrms in the ﬁrst
comparison do not. This can be due to the weak
governance of state-owned ﬁrms which led to
lessening the role of audit committees in enhancing
disclosure practice. Also, the positive impact of
foreign ownership in private ﬁrms is explained in
light of our earlier arguments that foreign invest-
ment is attracted to all ﬁrms in the privatising
country.
We repeat the previous analyses after dropping
the variable PRIV from the models of the privatised
groups. Untabulated results indicate that there is no
signiﬁcant shift in coefﬁcient values of the year
dummy variables.
6.3. Robustness checks
We undertake an untabulated test to ascertain the
robustness of our results. We repeat the previous
multivariate analyses using the normal scores
approach and the rank transformation approach.
The normal scores approach was advocated by
Cooke (1998) as having a number of advantages,
namely that a normally distributed dependent
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 05 ABR Ali.3d Page 69 of 74
12 This is an alternative procedure to comparing privatised
ﬁrms with state-owned ones since Jordan has privatised most of
its state-owned ﬁrms.
13 Three ﬁrms were privatised in 2000 and were excluded
from the comparison.
14 The size of the sample ﬁrms used in the comparison is
small; however, the use of time series data improves the sample
size and provides accurate inferences of model parameters
(Hsiao, 2005).
15 In the non-privatised group (Table 8), there are no infra-
structure ﬁrms, hence IND1 variable is absent.
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variable implies that the errors are normally
distributed and that the signiﬁcance tests are
meaningful and have greater power. Haniffa and
Cooke (2002), Camfferman and Cooke (2002) and
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) all use normal score
transformation. Rank transformation has great
advantages when the data is monotone and non-
linear in nature (Iman and Conover, 1979). Beaver
et al. (1979), Cheng et al. (1992), Lang and
Lundholm (1993), Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace
and Naser (1995), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman
(2003) and Ali et al. (2004) all utilise rank
transformation. The results of the normal scores
and rank regression transformed models are con-
sistent with the results of the earlier models,
validating our results and supporting the ﬁndings.
7. Conclusion
This paper examined the inﬂuence of privatisation
on the extent of voluntary disclosure of 243
observations of privatised ﬁrms in Jordan over a
period of nine years from 1996 to 2004. We
employed a scoring system to develop a VDI and
used univariate and multivariate tests to investigate
the inﬂuence of privatisation on the extent of
voluntary disclosure. Our univariate test results
show that voluntary disclosure levels have signiﬁ-
cantly improved after privatisation in Jordan.
The paper further accounted for the dynamic
effects of privatisation and the accompanying
accounting regulatory measures and changes in
ownership through the use of panel data. The results
support the hypothesis that privatisation has posi-
tively inﬂuenced the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Foreign investment appears to be signiﬁcantly
associated with voluntary disclosure. This associ-
ation is positively inﬂuenced by privatisation,
which is consistent with the impact of privatisation
resulting in the transfer of ownership to foreign
investors. However, the involvement of the other
types of owners has no inﬂuence on the extent of
voluntary disclosure. Further, the accounting regu-
latory reforms produced signiﬁcant positive inﬂu-
ence on the extent of voluntary disclosure, and this
inﬂuence is more pronounced as a result of
privatisation. Company size and industry type 1
are found to be signiﬁcantly related with voluntary
disclosure practices by Jordanian ﬁrms. Liquidity
and auditor type are negatively associated with
voluntary disclosure.
Finally, using a methodology that controls for
time effects, we show that time has not inﬂuenced
the level of voluntary disclosure, while privatisa-
tion, the accompanying reforms and the attraction of
foreign ownership have all positively inﬂuenced the
level of voluntary disclosure of Jordanian listed
ﬁrms. Taken together, we conclude that the extent of
voluntary disclosure improves signiﬁcantly as a
result of privatisation, and that regulatory reforms
and foreign investors account for a signiﬁcant
fraction of that improvement.
The ﬁndings of the study are timely, given the
signiﬁcance and the effort put into the Jordanian
privatisation programme and the accompanying
reforms. However, the results indicate that individ-
ual and institutional investors need to be more
effective in monitoring management which in turn
will have a positive effect on share value. This
might be achieved by enacting new regulations that
enhance shareholders’ role in the governance of the
ﬁrm.
The study has some limitations. It did not account
for the inﬂuence of certain economic reforms that
accompany privatisation such as price deregulation
and market liberalisation which would have an
impact on ﬁrms’ efﬁciency that, in turn, would
inﬂuence disclosure. Future research could investi-
gate the impact of these factors on corporate
voluntary disclosure.
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